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ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, MULTINATIONAL 
COMPANIES AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Concerns have been expressed that in a global market place with mobile capital, 
national governments will have incentives to set weak environmental policies 
(“environmental dumping”) to protect the international competitiveness of their 
domestic firms, that these incentives are particularly strong in industries where plants 
may be relatively footloose, so that governments are concerned to prevent “capital 
flight”, and that footloose plants are particularly associated with multinational firms. 
It is then often suggested that appropriate policy responses would be to seek to 
harmonise environmental regulations or impose minimum standards for 
environmental regulations.  
In this paper we set out these concerns in terms of a number of more precisely made 
claims and then review recent developments in economic analysis (including some of 
our own work) and empirical evidence to show that the claims cannot be generally 
sustained and that the suggested policies may be harmful. However, devising more 
appropriate policies is by no means straightforward. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is considerable public concern that globalisation - the liberalisation of trade 
and capital flows - leads to policy competition between governments, which in the 
context of environmental policy may induce governments to set too lax 
environmental policies (environmental dumping) in order to protect their 
international competitiveness. It is further argued that this incentive is particularly 
strong when firms are footloose so that governments may worry about ‘capital flight’, 
and multinational firms are particularly prone to such footloose behaviour. The fear 
of environmentalists is that competition between governments to retain or attract 
such footloose firms is thought to trigger a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ in environmental 
policies. In the NAFTA debate the possibility of firms/plants relocating from the US 
to Mexico was an issue and a similar concern is expressed about the enlargement of 
the EU to include Eastern European countries. To counteract such incentives for 
environmental dumping it is often suggested that agencies such as the European 
Union should seek to harmonise environmental policies of member states or at least 
set ‘minimum standards’ for environmental policies. 
Behind this set of concerns we can identify a number of separate claims: 
Claim 1. Firms will locate production in countries with weaker environmental 
policies. 
Claim 2.  Countries with footloose firms will do less well than countries with less 
footloose firms. 
Claim 3. Trade liberalisation gives governments incentives to weaken their 
environmental policies for strategic trade reasons (‘environmental dumping’). 
Claim 4. There will be more environmental dumping when firms are footloose than 
when their locations are fixed. 
Claim 5. Multinational firms are particularly prone to switch production between 
countries in response to environmental policies, in the extreme case closing plants in 
some countries. 
Claim 6. The appropriate policy responses to environmental dumping are the 
harmonisation of environmental policies or the setting of ‘minimum standards’ for 
environmental policies. 
In this paper we shall review recent literature, both in economic analysis and 
empirical work, and show that none of the above claims can be sustained as general 
propositions. In the next section we review what can be said in terms of economic 
analysis about claims 1 - 5 while in section 3 we review recent literature on empirical 
aspects of these claims. In section 4 we discuss the policy implications of the 
previous two sections, and in particular assess the status of claim 6.  4 
2. WHAT DOES ECONOMIC ANALYSIS TELL US ABOUT 
CLAIMS 1 - 5 ? 
To address all the issues addressed in claims 1 - 5 would require a model with three 
key features: 
(i) To take seriously issues of location of plants and firms, and in particular of 
multinational companies requires models in which there are significant increasing 
returns to scale, captured most simply by fixed costs of setting up plants and firms. 
This immediately implies that we will dealing with imperfectly competitive markets
1. 
It also means that we shall need to consider strategic interactions between firms both 
in output markets and in their location decisions
2.  
(ii) To take seriously the notion of ‘environmental dumping’ we also need to assume 
that there is strategic competition between governments in terms of their 
environmental policies and one definition of environmental dumping is to contrast 
the policies governments would set if they act non-cooperatively with those they 
would set if they acted cooperatively
3. So we shall need to model a policy game 
between governments. 
(iii) To take seriously the notion that in setting their environmental policies   
governments are concerned with their impact on location decisions of firms we need 
to assume not only that firms will change their location decisions depending on the 
environmental policies set by governments but that governments can commit 
themselves to environmental policies prior to firms choosing where to locate. Taken 
together with points (i) and (ii) this implies that we need to consider multi-stage 
games and that there will be important timing issues in such games. We shall follow 
the literature in contrasting two extreme cases. In Location Games governments are 
able to commit themselves to environmental policies prior to firms choosing their 
locations. We shall contrast this with what we call Market Share Games where firms 
first choose their locations and governments then set their environmental policies, 
and this contrast will throw light on issue of whether there is more or less 
environmental dumping when governments worry about capital flight
4. This is a very 
crude contrast between the relative degrees of commitment of governments to their 
environmental policies and firms to their location choices
5. 
                                                            
1 For a review of what can be said about incentives for environmental dumping in competitive markets 
see Ulph (1997a). 
2 Modelling location choices can become complex because of the discrete nature of these choices. This 
causes payoff functions for firms to be discontinuous, and in turn this causes the welfare functions for 
governments to be discontinuous (see Markusen, Morey and Olewiler (1993), Ulph and Valentini 
(1997)) for further discussion. 
3 An alternative definition is to contrast the policies governments set when acting non-cooperatively 
with a simple ‘first-best’ rule for environmental policy such as equating marginal abatement and 
damage costs.  
4 Note that even in the Market Share Game firms may still base their location decisions on the 
environmental policies which they expect (rationally) governments to introduce after they have 
located. 
5 Of course a richer model would be a multi-stage game where one models explicitly what leads to 
different degrees of commitment by firms and governments; Feenstra (1998) conducts such analysis 
for the case where firms have to choose investment in capital, and shows that a multi-stage game can  5 
Not surprisingly, there is no single model which captures all the features set out 
above so we shall review a small number of models which cast light on different 
aspects of the claims we wish to test
6. We begin with an extremely simple model of 
location choice based which we used in a recent paper (Ulph and Valentini (1998)) 
and which draws heavily on the model by Hoel (1997). This has the merit of 
providing a setting in which many of the concerns and claims set out in the 
introduction can be justified. We shall then show how moving away from the very 
simple model invalidates the claims. 
2.1 The Simplest Possible Model. 
Assume that there is only one firm and only two countries in which it can locate. 
There are no transport costs or capacity constraints, so that the firm will only use one 
plant, so that the notion of a multinational firm cannot arise. The firm sells its 
product in countries other than the two in which it can locate. Production costs are 
the same in both countries. Production causes pollution, some of which may be 
abated at a cost. Unabated pollution causes damage in the country in which the firm 
is located, but countries have the same damage costs. Clearly the firm will locate in 
the country that sets the weaker environmental policy. We assume that the country in 
which the firm locates imposes a 100% pure profits tax so that profits accrue to the 
country of production. Governments use a simple emission limit (e) to regulate 
pollution. Welfare of the country where the firm locates is thus given by profits of the 
firm less environmental damage, shown as V(e) in Figure 1, while welfare of the 
other country is zero. 
If the firm chooses its location before the government sets its policy, then the 
government in which the firm locates will simply set the emission limit, e*, which 
maximises welfare. This will be the usual first-best emission limit such that marginal 
abatement cost equals marginal damage cost, so there is no strategic element to 
environmental policy
7. Since the policy is the same for both countries, the firm will 
randomise where it locates, so each country will get expected  welfare  U(e*) = 
0.5V(e*). If governments choose their policies first, then if governments set the same 
emission limit, e, we assume that the firm randomises where it locates so that each 
government gets expected welfare U(e) = 0.5V(e), shown in Figure 1. If governments 
set different emission limits the firm locates in the country with the higher limit, and 
that country gets welfare V(e). The equilibrium of the game in emission limits will be 
a simple ‘race-to-the-bottom’ in which both governments set emission limit e  where 
welfare gets driven to zero. It cannot be an equilibrium for the governments to set the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
lead to different conclusions from a two-stage game but does not consider location decisions. D. Ulph 
(1995) also notes that rather than starting from the assumption that firms choose locations de novo in a 
world of liberalised trade and capital flows it may make more sense to assume that globalisation is a 
process so that one starts from a position of autarky in which there are already established firms 
located in different countries. 
6 For other surveys see Markusen (1996), Rauscher (1995), Wilson (1996). 
7 This depends crucially on the assumptions that there are no consumers in each country and the 
country in which the firm locates earns all the profits. So although the firm is a monopolist the 
government is quite content for it to maximise profits. The only distortion as far as the government in 
which the firm locates is concerned is the environmental distortion. If there were consumers in the 
country the government would set policy weaker than first-best to offset the monopoly distortion; if the 
country did not capture all profits the government would set policy tougher than first-best as a way of 
capturing foreign profits.  6 
same emission limit below e  because by setting a marginally higher emission limit a 
government could get welfare V(e) > U(e), and it cannot be an equilibrium for 
governments to set different emission limits if the government with the higher 
emission limit gets strictly positive welfare, since the other government could set a 
marginally higher emission limit and get positive rather than zero welfare.  
This very simple model would seem to confirm most of the fears outlined in the 
introduction: firms choose to locate where environmental policies are weakest (claim 
1); competition between governments to attract capital induces them to weaken their 
environmental policies (claim 3) and indeed this takes the form of a ‘race-to-the-
bottom’; environmental policies are weaker when governments have to worry about 
the location of firms than when they do not, i.e. ee > *(claim 4); and the countries 
are worse off with footloose firms than when firms are not footloose, in the sense that 
Ue Ue (* ) () >= 0 (claim 2). The model does not allow us to address claim 5. 
However, even within the context of this very simple model, not all these claims are 
robust. For the argument depends on the assumption that V(e*) ≥  0, so that there are 
some emission limits for which damage costs are less than the profits which the firm 
earns. But suppose environmental damage costs are so high that V(e*) < 0, then 
while the outcome with fixed location will be as before (the government in the 
country with the firm sets emission limit e*) with endogenous location both 
governments will set such tough environmental policies that no firm would want to 
locate in their countries - the NIMBY outcome. This would immediately overturn 
claims 2, 3 and 4.  
It might be argued that the NIMBY case is only relevant for a few extreme cases (e.g. 
disposal of nuclear waste) so that the general conclusion from this simple model is to 
confirm many of the concerns and claims outlined in the Introduction. We now turn 
to various ways in which the simple model might be extended. 
2.2 Allowing for Multi-National Production. 
A key feature of the simple model is that there are no transport (trade) costs so that, 
even if we take the more general Hoel (1997) version of the model which allows for 
consumers in both countries, the firm would only operate one plant. Markusen, 
Morey and Olewiler (1995) (henceforth MMO) use a model which has a very similar 
structure to the simple Hoel model except that they have transport costs
8, so that the 
firm has to decide whether  to have a single plant, and if so where to locate it, or to 
have a plant in each country (i.e. to go multi-national). Note that an immediate 
implication is that if, in the absence of any environmental policies in either country, 
the equilibrium choice is for the firm to locate plants in each country, because profits 
are strictly greater with the multi-national equilibrium than with an equilibrium with 
a single plant exporting to the other country, then if one country introduces an 
environmental policy there will be a range of values for the environmental policy 
                                                            
8 There are some other differences which do not affect the general point we make; thus there is no 
third set of countries to which the firm can export; where the firm sets up a single plant in one country 
the governments can use an export tax. Because, as noted in footnote 2, of the discontinuities this 
introduces in the firm’s payoffs and hence welfare payoffs they have to rely on special functional 
forms and some numerical examples to illustrate their argument.  7 
before it would pay the firm to switch to the equilibrium with a plant located in the 
country with no environmental policy. Thus the introduction of transport costs, which 
is needed to rationalise a multinational pattern of production, provides a degree of 
protection to a country to set a tougher environmental policy than other countries 
without fear of losing plants to rival countries. So this contradicts claims 1 and 5.  
MMO again compare the policies governments would set after the firm has made its 
choice of plant location, with the policies governments would set prior to the firm 
deciding where to locate its plant(s). MMO reach the same conclusion as Hoel about 
the possibility of a NIMBY outcome - with high enough damage costs both 
governments will set prohibitive environmental policies to deter any plant being 
located in their countries, despite the fact in terms of global welfare it would be 
desirable that the product be produced. But there is an interesting twist to the ‘race-
to-the-bottom’ case. When governments set their policies after the firm has chosen its 
plant locations (so, as in the simple model, there is no strategic competition between 
governments) there will be two possibilities - the firm chooses a single plant and 
exports to the other country or it locates a plant in each country, with the first 
outcome being chosen when the fixed cost of setting up a plant is relatively high.  In 
both cases when we switch to having the governments set environmental policies 
before the firm chooses plant locations then there will be competition to weaken 
environmental policies, so claims 3 and 4 remain true. But if in the non-strategic 
case, the outcome involved the firm setting up a single plant, then in the process of 
competition the firm may decide to switch to having two plants, while if the non-
strategic outcome involved the firm having two plants this will remain the outcome 
when the governments compete strategically. Thus strategic competition may lead to 
the firm proliferating plants, but, except in the NIMBY outcome, not to it reducing 
the number of plants. The rationale is this. The firm is trading off the fixed costs of 
setting up plants against the transport costs of having to export. Suppose in the non-
strategic case governments set tough environmental standards so that production 
costs are high; then output will be relatively low, transport costs will be low relative 
to total production costs and it will not be economic for the firm to carry two sets of 
fixed plant costs; however as the governments compete and weaken environmental 
policies this will reduce production costs relative to transport costs, expand sales in 
each country and make it more attractive for the firm to set up a second plant.  
Thus allowing for the possibility of multi-national production means that, if again we 
exclude the NIMBY outcomes, in addition to governments setting weaker 
environmental policies when they take account of plant location decisions, this may 
lead to excessive numbers of plants being set up - too many multi-national plants. In 
other words the link between weak environmental policies and multinational firms 
may be the opposite of what environmentalists suppose - it is because governments 
set weak environmental policies that this may allow multinational patterns of 
production to come into being; multinational firms are a response to weak 
environmental policies rather than weak environmental policies being a response to 
multinational firms. 
2.3 Allowing for Many Firms.  8 
In 2.2 we extended the simple model by allowing a single firm to set up more than 
one plant. In this section we consider what happens if we revert to the assumption of 
no transport costs, so each firm has a single plant, but now assume there may be 
more than one firm. As the simplest possible extension to the simple model of 
section 2.1 we take the model of Ulph and Valentini (1998) in which there are two 
firms which  engage in Cournot competition. The key difference this makes to the 
conclusions of the simple model is that even if we ignore the NIMBY case, 
environmental policy when governments set policy before firms choose to locate may 
be tougher than when they set policy after firms choose where to locate; i.e.  claim 4 
may no longer hold.  There are four reasons why introducing more firms changes the 
conclusions of the simple model. 
(i) With fixed locations there is now the possibility that the two firms locate in 
separate countries. In this case, given the assumptions we have made and contrary to 
the previous two sub-sections, there will be strategic incentives for governments to 
engage in environmental dumping and set weaker environmental policies than they 
would set if they cooperated
9 for the usual rent-shifting reasons familiar from 
strategic trade theory. To see why this might change the conclusion it is possible that, 
for some parameter values, the non-cooperative equilibrium between governments 
when firms have already decided to locate in separate countries, involves such 
intense competition that governments set such lax environmental policies that 
countries get negative welfare. When governments set their policies before firms 
locate they would never choose to end up with negative welfare; so, for these 
parameter values, even if there was a race-to-the-bottom in which countries got zero 
wlefare with endogenous locations this may involve governments setting tougher 
policies than in the game where firms’ locations are fixed. 
(ii) Precisely because there is now competition between the firms, it may no longer 
be the case that relaxing environmental policies always leads to higher profits for 
firms; in the absence of environmental policies total output would be higher than that 
which maximises profits, so there will be cases (with low environmental damage 
costs) where toughening environmental policies may raise profits and this may limit 
the race-to-the-bottom. 
(iii) If damage costs are strictly convex, then, for any given level of output and 
pollution by each firm, while having both firms locate in one country will double the 
profits that country can earn it will more than double the environmental damage costs 
that country has to bear. Now if we think of the two-firms analogue of the race-to-the 
bottom argument set out in Figure 1, we want to compare the welfare a country gets 
if it sets a higher emission limit than its rival and hence attracts both firms, V(e), with 
the expected welfare it gets if it sets the same emission limit as its rival and both 
firms randomise where to locate, U(e); in calculating this expected welfare we now 
include the possibility that the two firms locate in different countries. Because of the 
convex damage cost argument it may no longer be the case that V(e) > U(e); indeed 
Ulph and Valentini  show that there must always be some values of e below e  for 
which  V(e) < U(e) and indeed this may be true for all e. This introduces the 
possibility of multiple equilibria for the game where firms are footloose, and while 
                                                            
9 In particular the assumptions of Cournot competition and the fact all profits accrue to the country in 
which the firm is located lead to environmental dumping (see Ulph (1997a) for more discussion.  9 
these will include the race-to-the-bottom equilibrium they may also include equilibria 
which have tougher emission limits than when firm locations are fixed. Hoel (1997) 
makes a similar argument when extending his model from one to many firms.  
(iv) A further implication of the convex damage cost argument is that when we 
consider the environmental policies governments will set when firms’ locations are 
fixed, it is quite natural to assume that they will set different environmental policies 
depending on whether one or two firms locate in their countries, in other words we 
can think of environmental policies being conditioned on the number of firms that 
locate in those countries. However the argument sketched out in (iii), and which is 
used by other authors when considering models of endogenous firm location with 
more than one firm
10, assumes that governments set a single environmental policy 
independent of the number of firms, so that if governments set different emission 
limits then all firms locate in the same country. But if we want to compare the 
difference in policies when firms have fixed or endogenous locations, and we do this 
by varying the move structure of the game, then if we allow a government to 
condition its policy instrument on the number of firms located in its country under 
one move structure we should do so under both. This means that when governments 
set policies before firms locate, governments can separate the emission limits they set 
to attract one firm to locate from that which they set to attract both firms to locate. 
Speaking loosely this means that governments are not driven into an all-or-nothing 
race-to-the-bottom but can settle for sharing the firms between them. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, if governments know they can secure an equilibrium where one firm 
will locate in each country they will the same level of emission limits as if these 
locations were fixed, so we get exactly the same outcome irrespective of whether 
firms locations are fixed or endogenous. This occurs for a wide class of parameter 
values. This is illustrated in Figure 2 where W(e) is the welfare a country gets when 
the two firms locate in separate countries and V(e) is the welfare a country gets when 
both firms locate in a single country. e
N is the Nash equilibrium emission limits the 
governments would set in the Market Share Game where they set policies after the 
firms have chosen to locate in separate countries. If the configuration of W and V is 
as shown in Figure 2, which is true for a wide range of parameters, then e
N would 
also be an equilibrium of the Location Game where governments set policies before 
firms choose their location, because it would not pay a government to try to attract 
both firms to locate in its country.  
In summary, introducing many firms means that even excluding the NIMBY 
outcome, it need no longer be the case that governments engage in more 
environmental dumping when firms choose their locations in response to government 
policies than when government policies are set after firms have fixed their locations, 
and indeed for a wide class of cases the move structure makes no difference. Ulph 
and Valentini (1998) showed that the greater the degree of substitution between 
firms’ products (and hence the greater the degree of market competition) the more 
likely it was that environmental policy would be tougher in Location Games 
(endogenous locations) than in Market Share Games (fixed locations). 
2.4 Many firms and plants. 
                                                            
10 See Hoel (1997), Markusen, Morey and Olewiler (1993) although in the latter case the authors do 
not study policy competition between governments.  10 
Markusen (1996) extends the analysis of the two previous sections by considering a 
general equilibrium model with two identical countries (denoted h and f for home 
and foreign) and two sectors - a competitive sector and a non-competitive sector. 
Within the non-competitive sector firms may be national (i.e. a single plant in h or a 
single plant in f) or multi-national (type m). The number of each type of firm and the 
amount that each firm produces is determined endogenously, using a zero-profit 
condition. Given the complexity of the model, Markusen does not analyse the non-
cooperative setting of environmental policies by the two governments but rather just 
studies the impact of the foreign government unilaterally introducing an 
environmental policy which can affect either the marginal or fixed cost of production 
in country f. However there are results from his model which allow us to say 
something about claim 5  - that multinational firms encourage the switching of 
production between countries in response to environmental policies.  
Figure 3 shows the types of configurations of firms that exist in equilibrium for 
different combinations of trade costs and environmental cost penalties in country f. 
The top row shows what would happen in the absence of any environmental policy in 
f ; for low transport costs only national firms exist, while for high transport costs only 
multinational firms exist. For low transport costs, as production costs rise in country f  
rise, production will be switched away from f firms to h firms and eventually only h 
firms survive. With high transport costs, as costs in country f rise multinational firms 
will also switch production between from their f to h plants, and as costs in f rise it is 
possible for national firms in h to enter the market and export to f. Because of general 
equilibrium effects, type f firms can also emerge. With high enough production costs, 
multinational firms shut down (this is just the converse of the argument in section 2.2 
that saw multinational activity expand as environmental polices weakened) and 
eventually only h firms survive.  
Note first that the cost differential at which production in f shuts down completely is 
(slightly) higher when we start with multinational production than when we start with 
solely national firms. Markusen also reports that a detailed analysis of production 
shows that production switches more slowly from f to h when we start with 
multinational firms than with only national firms. Both these findings would seem to 
contradict claim 5 - that multinational firms exacerbate the process of switching 
production out of countries with high environmental costs. However Markusen noted 
that these findings are not due to multinational firms per se but rather to the fact that 
the existence of multinational firms can only be rationalised when there are high 
transport costs and it is this that protects production in country f from increases in its 
production costs due to environmental policy. However, in welfare terms high 
transport costs raise the costs of  tougher environmental  policies in f for the obvious 
reason that it increases the cost to consumers in f having to buy more of their 
consumption from country h and this effect outweighs any production gains, at least 
for Markusen’s model. Dampening down the loss of production in response to 
environmental policies may not be beneficial. 
A similar point was made in Ulph (1994) where it was shown that using tax rebates 
to reduce the incentive for firms to relocate abroad in response to environmental 
policy (i.e. reducing the extent to which domestic firms are footloose) may be 
counterproductive if that leaves domestic firms faced with higher costs and hence  11 
domestic consumers with higher prices than would otherwise be the case; Motta and 
Thisse (1994) make a similar point with respect to the use of protectionist policies to 
reduce the incentives for firms to relocate abroad. 
2.5  Agglomeration Effects.  
In all the models studied in the previous sections,  environmental policy has affected  
location decisions through its impact on costs of production and hence on profits. To 
focus attention on the impact of environmental policies on location we have assumed 
that countries are identical (so there are no comparative advantage factors affecting 
location decisions). In the models in sections 2.1 and 2.3 with no transport costs 
small differences in environmental policies would be sufficient to induce firms to 
locate in the country with weaker environmental policies. In the models in sections 
2.2 and 2.4 transport costs, which are necessary to rationalise multinational 
production, provided a degree of protection for a country to set a tougher 
environmental policy than rivals without losing all its production. Indeed Figure 3 
shows that as environmental costs rise in country f there will be a steady decline in 
the number of plants and firms located in country f rather than any sudden exodus of 
production. The reason for this is that if a small toughening of environmental policy 
in f makes it marginally profitable for a plant to switch from country f to country h 
then that switch will marginally raise the profitability of firms that remain in f and 
reduce the profitability of plants located in h, thus reducing the incentive for any 
other plant to switch location. 
 
Consider what happens to this argument if what matters in making location decisions 
is more than just costs of production, but also proximity to markets or sources of 
supply. Thus suppose that because of the input-output structure of production for 
producers in a particular sector, a significant fraction of their market will be 
producers in other sectors who use the output of this particular sector as inputs to 
their production processes; similarly, a significant fraction of the inputs used by 
producers in the particular sector will be the outputs of producers in yet other sectors. 
Thus because sectors are linked in the structure of production, the location decisions 
of producers in different sectors become interdependent. This provides incentives for 
agglomeration of producers. Consider then what happens if a producer in a particular 
sector decides to close a plant in a particular location. As noted above, within the 
sector itself that has the usual effect that by reducing supply in that sector it will raise 
the profits of the producers who remain in that sector in that location. But it will also 
have two knock-on effects. It will reduce the demand for the products it used as 
inputs, and so reduce the profits of plants which supplied that producer, which will 
typically be plants located close to the original producer. Second it will raise the 
input costs of plants which used the output of the original plant as inputs, since they 
will now have to get their inputs from more distantly related producers. Again these 
customers will have been located close to the original plant. If these reductions in 
profits in related sectors were sufficiently strong to cause the closure of some of the 
plants in those sectors that would in turn have negative impacts on the profits of the 
plants remaining in the original sector, which, if inter-sectoral linkages were strong 
enough could offset the original boost to profits of those plants caused by the closure 
of the original plant. Venables (1994) and Ulph and Valentini (1997) analyse models 
of strategic environmental policy when there are agglomeration effects due to inter-
sectoral linkages of production.  12 
 
There are two implications of this analysis of agglomeration. First, there is the 
possibility that with strong inter-sectoral linkages there is the scope for quite 
catastrophic effects of policy on location decisions of producers when critical 
thresholds are reached. This can be characterised by the concept that a country can 
lose its manufacturing base in a particular set of related industries. Thus even if there 
are transport costs which would be expected to give countries a degree of isolation of 
their production from increases in domestic costs, agglomeration effects may 
reintroduce the possibility that there could be critical thresholds at which a small 
toughening of environmental policy in one country triggers a substantial exodus of 
production. Second, when agglomeration effects are strong what matters to producers 
is being located close to producers in related sectors; where that happens to be is less 
important. This can mean that for a range of parameter values, including policy 
parameters, there can be multiple possible equilibria, e.g. it is perfectly consistent 
with a particular set of parameters that a particular set of industries be located either 
in h or f, while outside that range of parameters there may be a single equilibrium. 
This has an important implication for policy that it introduces a kind of “hysteresis 
effect”. Suppose that at a very low level of environmental taxes, say, the only 
equilibrium is for a set of  industries to locate in f. As environmental policy in f gets 
stricter there may emerge another equilibrium in which the industries could locate in 
the h. But given that the industries are already located in f, no individual producer 
would wish to switch to h. When environmental policy in f gets strict enough, it is no 
longer possible to sustain the industries in f, and production switches to h. But now if 
f subsequently relaxes its environmental policy, by the same argument, the producers 
will not switch back to f unless the environmental policies reverted to the very low 
level at which location in f  was the only possible equilibrium. Figure 4, from Ulph 
and Valentini (1997) illustrates this possibility for a two-country, two-sector 
(upstream and downstream) model in which there are two firms in each sector who 
have to decide how many plants to locate in each country.  For a wide class of 
parameter values, in the absence of any environmental policy agglomeration effects 
lead to all firms locating a single plant in country 1. Country 1 introduces an 
emission tax but as long as it lies below 1.5 the strength of agglomeration effects 
means that it remains a unique equilibrium for all firms to locate in country 1. For 
taxes between 1.5 and 2.0 there is a second equilibrium in which 3 firms relocate in 
country 2; for taxes above 2.0 this second equilibrium is unique. So an emission tax 
above 2.0 would trigger a rapid exodus of firms from country 1 but country 1 would 
have to cut its tax below 1.5 to attract these firms back again. 
 
 
 
2.6 Time Structure Revisited. 
 
As D. Ulph (1995) notes, it is not really appropriate to use the term “hysteresis” for 
the above discussion, for there is no real dynamics in which environmental policies 
change and firms relocate; it is simply a question of multiple equilibria in what we 
have called a Location Game with agglomeration effects where we start with 
essentially a blank sheet in terms of firms and their locations and consider how firms 
would choose the locations of their plants once and for all in response to 
environmental policies previously set by governments. As noted in footnote 5, a  13 
proper analysis of hysteresis would require a multi-period interaction between 
governments and firms in which governments can change their policies from one 
period to the next and firms can change their locations in response to these changes 
in policy. As he notes, it is then important to distinguish between sunk costs, which 
are incurred when a plant is initially established and would have to be incurred again 
if a plant was relocated, from recurrent fixed costs of producing a positive output 
level in any period. It is the need to incur this sunk cost which gives a degree of 
commitment to firms location decisions and which may mean that locations selected 
in previous periods may not be changed in response to policies which would have 
induced an alternative location choice by firms making that location choice from 
scratch
11. For such a multi-period model of hysteresis to work one would also need to 
explain why governments would wish to change environmental policies from one 
period to the next, and whether there are any factors (analogous to sunk costs) which 
might lead governments to commit to environmental policies (reputation effects 
might be a candidate). In his paper, the dynamics used by D. Ulph to motivate a 
change in environmental policy is the opening up of countries to trade. This has the 
usual effects - an increased market size effect which acts to increase profits, and 
increased competition effect which acts to reduce profits and a relocation effect of 
production switching from countries with high autarkic costs to those with low 
autarkic costs. In addition there will be any induced change in government 
environmental policies. He shows that while the opening up of trade will lead 
governments to set weaker environmental policies than under autarky, for a wide 
range of parameters the number of firms will be exactly the same as under autarky. 
This is because the gain in profits due to the net effect of increased market size and 
weaker environmental policies less the impact of increased competition is 
insufficient to compensate for the sunk costs needed to establish new firms. 
 
However it should be noted that the trade liberalisation which drives the change in 
environmental policy is unanticipated by firms, for otherwise this would have 
influenced their initial location decisions. In the context of environmental policy we 
know of no fully specified multi-period analysis in which governments calculate their 
environmental policies each period and firms calculate their location decisions each 
period, with firms and governments acting strategically and with rational 
expectations, with a proper account of what might determine the relative degrees of 
commitment by firms and governments which would allow a proper analysis of 
hysteresis effects.  
2.7  Summary. 
 
If, in addition to the complexities outlined in the previous paragraph, we add the 
desirability of including transport costs and the simultaneous determination of 
multinational and national firms, and the possibility of inter-sectoral linkages with 
agglomeration effects it is clear why we said at the start of this section that we are a 
long way from having a single model which can address all of the issues outlined in 
the Introduction. Nevertheless from our review of a number of models which throw 
                                                            
11 Motta and Thisse (1994) also note that because firms have prior locations in which they have 
incurred sunk costs the extent of delocation in response to environmental policies may be less than 
suggested by models which ignore such sunk costs  14 
some light on certain aspects of the issues we can reach the following conclusions 
about claims 1 -5 set out in the Introduction. 
 
1. Allowing for transport costs, agglomeration effects, sunk costs all mean that even 
with no comparative advantage effects there could be significant differences in 
environmental policies between countries without inducing firms to switch plants to 
countries with weaker environmental policies. 
 
2. Even if firms are tempted to relocate abroad in response to difference in 
environmental policies it does not follow that a country is better off having less 
footloose firms, because if that leaves domestic firms with higher costs and domestic 
producers with higher prices, welfare may be lower than if firms had relocated 
abroad and exported back to the home country. 
 
3. While there are certainly circumstances under which governments have incentives 
to weaken environmental policies when acting non-cooperatively, as we have shown 
there are other cases where governments will want to set too tough policies (e.g. 
NIMBYISM, where governments seek implicitly to tax foreign profits). 
 
4. While there are models where governments will set much weaker environmental 
policies when they are trying to influence locations than when they set policies with 
fixed locations, this is by no means always the case; the discussion in section 2.3 
showed that there may be many cases where environmental policies are unaffected by 
the timing of government policy setting relative to firms location decisions; when 
policies differ,  the more intense is market competition (as measured by the degree of 
substitution between firms products) the more likely it is that environmental policy 
will be tougher when governments take account of the location decisions of firms in 
setting their policies. 
 
5. Finally the discussion in sections 2.2 and 2.4 emphasised that because 
multinational patterns of production are most likely to be competitive against 
national production when transport costs are high relative to production costs, these 
high transport costs will also reduce the sensitivity of domestic production to 
differences between domestic environmental costs and foreign environmental costs. 
Moreover it may be that multinational firms are a response to weak environmental 
policies rather than weak environmental policies being a response to multinational 
firms.  15 
3. EMPIRICAL STUDIES. 
 
In this section we review some of the empirical literature which attempts to assess 
whether environmental legislation has a significant impact on the plant location 
decisions of firms. Because there are several excellent recent surveys of this 
literature, (Cropper and Oates (1992), Markusen (1996), Rauscher (1995) and 
especially Levinson (1996a)) we shall be relatively brief. We shall draw heavily on 
the survey by Levinson (1996a). He begins by quoting a number of sources from 
international organisations such as OECD, international and national industrial 
associations, US politicians of all parties who all believe that industrial delocation in 
response to stringent environmental legislation is a major issue and have proposed 
steps to try to limit its effect. However, he then surveys a wide range of different 
kinds of evidence which suggest that these concerns are not borne out in practice.  
 
The first kind of evidence reviewed by Levinson (1996a) is surveys, from different 
countries, of factors which businesses say influence their international location 
decisions, and in the vast majority of cases environmental regulations are 
unimportant; there is some evidence that in particular industries, such as chemicals, 
environmental regulations feature more importantly (Knogden (1979) in a survey of 
West German firms that invested in developing countries), although these industries 
were also more sensitive to all cost factors. One possible explanation is an UNCTAD 
survey of multinational companies which suggested that such companies were 
concerned with environmental regulations in their home countries rather than their 
host countries - i.e. they applied the same (tougher) environmental regulations 
wherever they located. 
 
The second form of evidence is data on trade patterns. Most of these studies use 
various aggregate indicators of trade to see whether they are influenced by 
environmental variables. For example, Grossman and Krueger (1993) studied US-
Mexico trade patterns for a wide range of industries and showed, as Heckscher-Ohlin 
would suggest, that the US tends to import from Mexico goods that have relatively 
low skilled labour and capital content; they also included a variable capturing US 
pollution abatement costs by industry and showed this had a positive effect on 
imports from Mexico, but the variable was quantitatively small (and statistically 
insignificant) so that whatever effect US environmental legislation had in 
encouraging imports from Mexico was trivial. As Levinson (1996a) notes, a problem 
with almost all these studies is that they fail to properly control for all the other 
factors that might influence trade patterns. An exception is a study by Tobey (1990) 
of trade in 5 products which are pollution intensive; he regresses net exports of these 
5 products for a range of countries against 11 factor-endowment variables (the other 
factors which might explain trade patterns) and a variable which measures the 
strictness of the countries’ environmental policies on an index of 1 to 7. The 
environmental strictness variable is never significant, but Levinson (1996a) 
comments that the other variables do not have sensible patterns either so it may be 
that the data is just not adequate to address the question. 
 
The final set of studies surveyed by Levinson (1996a) are studies of location 
decisions by US firms across US states, which again consist of survey data and 
econometric studies of establishment-level decisions. Of the latter, the most  16 
comprehensive to date is one by Levinson himself (Levinson (1996b))
12. This is a 
study of the locations of new plants (those that appeared in the 1987 quinquennial 
Census of Manufactures but not the 1982). The use of new plants gets round the 
problem of sunk costs noted in the last section; another reason for focusing on new 
plants is that many environmental regulations apply specifically to new plants. A 
major difficulty with studies of this type is the construction of appropriate measures 
of environmental stringency and Levinson confronts this issues by using six different 
measures of stringency - three being various indicators of stringency of legislation, 
one being number of employees involved in state environmental agencies (to capture 
stringency of enforcement rather than just what is on the statute book) and two 
measuring  abatement costs. The model follows a standard conditional logit model of 
plant location in which the probability of a plant in locating in a particular state is 
related to a whole set of state characteristics - business taxes, employment costs, 
energy costs, unionisation, infrastructure etc  and the environmental stringency 
variable. Levinson first analysed the full sample of new firms and showed that the 
location decisions of new plants which were branch plants of large companies were 
more sensitive to ‘manufacturing climate’ than new plants in general, which would 
be consistent with the view that multinational firms are more sensitive to 
environmental legislation than other firms, and in the rest of his analysis he 
concentrates on the new branch plants opened by largest 500 multi-plant 
manufacturing firms. The results of the conditional logit analysis shows that while 
the environmental stringency variable is always negative, it is significant in only two 
cases an index of legislative stringency constructed by the Fund for Renewable 
Energy and the Environment and an index of abatement costs. However even where 
these variables were significant, an analysis of the effects of an increase in 
environmental stringency (by one standard deviation) shows that the quantitative 
impact would be small (the probability of a plant locating in a state would drop by 
1.73%). Levinson then studied the location decisions by individual industries (17 
different SIC codes) and compared the impact of the environmental stringency 
variable with the overall pollution abatement costs to see if ‘dirty’ industries were 
more likely to be adversely affected by environmental legislation than clean 
industries and found no significant pattern.  
 
Similar results can be found in analyses of location decisions in other countries; an 
interesting recent example is a World Bank study (Mani, Pargal and Huq (1997)) of 
location decisions in India since studies for developing countries have been rare. 
They apply the same methodology as Levinson to all new large (over Rs 500 million) 
industrial projects in India in 1994, choosing large projects on the presumption that 
they would be more footloose. Stringency of environmental regulation is captured by 
the number of prosecutions in a state under the Air and Water Acts normalised by the 
number of medium and large size plants in the state. They find that environmental 
stringency actually has a positive effect on location choices, although this is not 
significant. Restricting attention only to the five most polluting industries confirms 
the result.  
 
The accumulation of evidence from many different kinds of studies and many 
different data sets all points to the same conclusion that environmental regulations 
                                                            
12 For example the study by McConnell and Schwab (1990) considers only the motor vehicle industry.  17 
either have no significant deterrent effect on plant locations, and where there is such 
an effect it is quantitatively small. In either case there seems to be a discrepancy 
between the public perception that capital flight caused by environmental legislation 
is sufficiently serious to warrant policy action and the available evidence. Levinson 
(1996a, b) summarises the four explanations why the empirical evidence shows such 
small effects, and whether this suggests the studies have not addressed the real issue.  
 
(i) He first dismisses the standard argument that environmental costs are too small to 
have an effect - in some industries in the US they can account for up to 15% of costs 
and this should be large enough to influence location decisions. 
 
(ii) A second possibility is that the various studies do not properly control for the 
different degrees of ‘footlooseness’ across types of firms or industries. We noted that 
Levinson focused on branch plants of large companies and Mani Pargal and Huq 
concentrated on large projects in both cases because it was believed that these would 
be more footloose (Levinson had evidence to support this).  But these may not really 
capture footlooseness. A recent study of trade data by van Beers and van den Bergh 
(1997) splits industries into resource-based and non-resource-based, with the later 
being presumed to be more footloose, and finds that there is a more significant effect 
of environmental regulation in footloose industries. 
 
(iii) A third possibility, which relates to discussion of policy in the next section, is 
that there may be omitted political economy dimensions. Levinson (1996a) refers to 
his ‘cynical interpretation’ that it would pay industry and politicians to exaggerate the 
threat that environmental legislation poses to local employment to justify other forms 
of assistance given to industry. Frederikson (1997b) has a theoretical model which 
supports this view (i.e. in a political economy equilibrium tough environmental 
legislation is offset by other subsidies offered to industry); in a personal 
communication he says this is being confirmed by empirical modelling for US states. 
This suggests that studies may not be properly picking up all the state taxes and 
subsidies offered by state governments.  
 
(iv) Finally there may be offsetting comparative advantage aspects which are not 
being properly picked up by the variables used to control for other factors affecting 
location decisions. Almost all of these other factors are cost related. A particular 
aspect of this argument would relate to agglomeration effects. Returning to the 
theoretical discussion in the last section, this could be a possible explanation the 
discrepancy between rhetoric and evidence; for the theory suggested that with strong 
agglomeration effects there could be a wide range of differences of environmental 
policies which would have no effect on location decisions, but then a critical 
threshold could be reached where a small further difference in policies has a 
‘catastrophic’ effect; the empirical evidence is picking up the former effect while the 
policy concern is picking up the latter.  It is obviously impossible to test this 
conjecture using conventional econometric modelling.  To assess whether in practice 
inter-sectoral linkages are strong enough to provide this kind of catastrophic effect 
Venables (1994) used a calibrated model of the world chemical industry, which is 
one which is always identified as highly polluting and thought to be particularly 
vulnerable to environmental legislation.  The industry is split into two sectors: basic 
chemicals and other chemicals; and there are four country groups: North America,  18 
Far East (Japan, Australia, New Zealand), Europe (EU+EFTA), and Rest of the 
World (other versions of the model have used different industrial sectors and intra-
EU countries). The linkage between the sectors is that basic chemicals contribute 
25% and 17% of the gross costs of producing basic chemicals and other chemicals 
respectively, while the corresponding figures for other chemicals are 2% and 9%. 
The policy instrument he uses is an energy tax imposed unilaterally by Europe 
(energy accounts directly for about 14% of the gross costs of basic chemicals and 
3.5% of other chemicals). Table 1 shows the impacts of different levels of taxes on 
the number of plants (N) and the unit operating costs of production (C) in the two 
industries in the three main blocks. 
 
Table 1 Impacts of a European Energy Tax on Plants and Costs 
(Index Form, No Tax Case 100) 
 
Tax           BASIC  CHEMICALS 
 
  OTHER CHEMICALS 
 
 %  North       
America 
 
   Far East 
 
   Europe 
 
   North 
America 
 
 Far East      Europe 
    N    C    N    C    N    C     N    C    N    C    N    C 
10  106      100 101 100 83  102 101 100 100 100 94  101 
20  113   99  101 100 64  105 102 100 101 100 87  102 
30  122   99  102 100 44  107 103   99  101 100 81  104 
40  135   98  102 100 18  110 104   99  101 100 73  105 
50  145   98  103 100     0  112 105   98  102 100 67  106 
 
What this shows is that when the energy tax rate reaches 50%, this will close down 
the European basic chemicals industry, with most of the production shifting to North 
America. Notice that given the moderate strength of the inter-sectoral linkages, there 
is no catastrophic decline in the industry at a particular threshold (nor was there any 
hysteresis effect), but the decline in plant numbers does accelerate as the tax rises. To 
understand the importance of the plant location decisions note that at the 50% tax 
rate unit costs have risen by 12% in Europe and declined by 2% in North America, so 
European competitiveness has declined by 14% relative to the U.S. Just under half of 
this can be accounted for by the effects of the energy tax on costs (both directly and 
indirectly through the higher costs of intermediate inputs). The rest of the cost 
increase is accounted for by the fact that suppliers are relocating to North America. 
Thus agglomeration effects have doubled the impact of the energy tax, which 
supports the claim that conventional models may understate the impact on 
competitiveness of environmental policies. 
In summary, the evidence to date provides little support for the concerns expressed 
by environmentalists and policy makers about the threat of delocation posed by 
stringent environmental legislation. We suggest that more attention to properly 
capturing the footlooseness of industries, to recognising the political dimensions and 
hence ensuring that all forms of industry assistance are captured, and allowing for 
agglomeration effects may help to reconcile the difference between empirical 
evidence and political rhetoric, although we do not exclude the possibility that 
popular debate is just blind to proper evidence.  19 
  20 
4.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS. 
 
From the review of economic analysis in section 2 we concluded that if governments 
act non-cooperatively they may seek to manipulate their environmental policies for 
strategic trade reasons in markets which are imperfectly competitive, but this need 
not always take the form of setting too lax environmental policies, nor is it the case 
that concerns about footloose firms necessarily give stronger incentives for 
weakening environmental policies than for sectors where firms locations can be taken 
as fixed, nor is it the case that multinational firms exacerbate switches of production 
between countries. From the review of the empirical literature we concluded that 
there was no very strong empirical evidence that firms’ location decisions were 
influenced by environmental policies. From this it might be concluded that policy 
concerns about delocation and environmental dumping are significantly exaggerated 
and so there is little need to do anything about it. This is reinforced by the argument 
that what lies behind the environmental dumping argument is essentially a ‘missing 
instruments’ problem. When markets are imperfectly competitive governments may 
have incentives to engage in strategic trade policies. If such policies are outlawed by 
trade liberalisation agreements then governments may turn to other policies, such as 
environmental policies, as proxies. But the same argument would apply to other 
policies, such as employment protection policies, and following the discussion of the 
empirical evidence, labour costs are in general more significant than environmental 
abatement costs and so environmental policy may not be the main focus of strategic 
behaviour. 
 
For the purpose of this section however, let us suppose that strategic manipulation of 
environmental policies is an issue to be taken seriously and ask what should be done 
about it. We shall address this question in its most general context, without explicit 
reference to delocation or multinationals, since, as we have argued, if there are 
incentives for environmental dumping they are not confined to delocation and 
multinationals.  Since the problem of strategic competition arises from governments 
setting their environmental policies non-cooperatively, the first issue is what 
institutions might induce international co-ordination of domestic environmental 
policies. Three possibilities might be considered. The first is to allow individual 
governments to take action against countries who they believe are engaging in 
environmental dumping, for example by reforming GATT articles to allow the use of 
countervailing tariffs against environmental dumping. There are many reasons to 
oppose this approach and we do not pursue it
13. A second possibility is the use of 
International Environmental Agreements as proposed for transboundary pollution. 
However this raises a whole set of other issues we do not wish to explore here. So we 
will simply assume that there exists some supra-national agency which can be given 
the power to set national environmental policies, which for concreteness we shall 
refer to as the “federal government” with national governments being “state 
                                                            
13 These reasons include: it is government not firms that are “dumping”; the difficulty of one 
government establishing what should be the “right” environmental policies of another government 
against which to measure “dumping”; if governments are engaging in environmental dumping for 
strategic trade reasons or at the behest of industrial lobby groups, what reason is there to believe that 
the countervailing tariff will not be used for similar purposes? For further discussion see Rauscher 
(1997), Bhagwati (1996).  21 
governments”, but recognising that this covers arrangements which are not formally 
federal, such as the EU.  
 
The next question is what form of intervention the federal government might make in 
state governments’ environmental policies. A commonly proposed approach is 
harmonisation of environmental policies supported by environmentalists to prevent a 
“race-to-the-bottom” and by industrialists to provide a “level playing field”
14. For the 
purpose of this section we shall take a strict definition of harmonisation to mean 
imposing either the same environmental standards or the same equiproportionate 
tightening of environmental standards.  
 
Harmonisation is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure the absence of distortions 
to policy. It is not sufficient because if all countries were identical they would all 
impose the same environmental policy but that would still differ from either the first-
best or the cooperative level of policy. It is not necessary because if countries differ 
in marginal damage costs or marginal abatement costs then first-best or cooperative 
environmental policies should differ between countries. Indeed, if countries differ 
significantly, then harmonisation cannot achieve even  a Pareto improvement over 
the non-cooperative outcome (see Kanbur, Keen and Wijnbergen (1995), Ulph 
(1997b)). This is illustrated in Fig. 5, based on Ulph (1997b) where, assuming just 
two states, we show the state governments’ reaction functions 
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1 == ( ), ( )as well as their iso-welfare contours. The first key point to 
note is that we have two versions of this diagram depending on whether 
environmental policies are strategic substitutes (Fig. 5a) or strategic complements 
(Fig 5b); depending on the nature of the model being employed or the nature of the 
environmental policy instrument being used by governments, either of these is 
possible. The second point to note is that in both cases we have shown the outcome 
where there is “environmental dumping” - there is a set of policies in the shaded area 
which would make both countries better off than in the non-cooperative equilibrium 
(point N), and these would involve both states having tougher (lower) emission 
standards than in the non-cooperative equilibrium. The third point to note is that we 
have assumed a significant asymmetry between the two states (e.g. different damage 
costs) so that in the non-cooperative equilibrium between state governments emission 
standards are laxer (higher) in state 1 than in state 2.  
 
If harmonisation involves setting equal emission standards for both states, a point on 
the 45°  line, then as can be seen from the diagram any such point would make state 1 
worse off than at point N. The reason is obvious. Harmonisation involves two 
aspects. It attempts to reduce total emissions, and since the non-cooperative 
equilibrium involves total emissions which are too high in terms of the total welfare 
of the two countries such a move will in general make countries better off. But it also 
involves changing market shares, with the high emissions country losing market 
share to the low emission country. This harms the high emission country, and if 
countries are sufficiently different, this second effect outweighs the first. As shown in 
Ulph (1997b), countries would only have to differ by about 50% in damage costs for 
                                                            
14 Bhagwati (1996) critiques various arguments that have been proposed for harmonisation of 
environmental and labour policies, and Leebron (1996) discusses different senses in which policies 
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harmonisation not to yield a Pareto improvement over the non-cooperative 
equilibrium. If harmonisation involves either equal absolute or proportionate 
reductions in emission standards, then it is clear from Figure 5 that this form of 
harmonisation may improve on the non-cooperative equilibrium. 
 
While it is obvious that with sufficient asymmetries between countries the strict form 
of harmonisation of environmental policies will not work, it is sometimes thought 
that a policy of minimum environmental standards would be desirable, on the 
grounds that it would raise environmental standards in countries which fell below the 
minimum standard, and if other countries choose to respond by also raising their 
standards it would only be because they were better off by doing so. The argument is 
that one “ratchets up” environmental standards across nation states. But this 
argument will also fail to deliver a Pareto improvement over the non-cooperative 
equilibrium if environmental policies are strategic substitutes as shown in Figure 5a. 
If state 1 is compelled to reduce its emission standard below the level 
ee
N
11  but above ~, state 2 would respond by raising its emission standard to a point on 
its reaction function between N and M. This clearly makes the home country worse 
off. Any minimum standard tougher than (i.e. lower than) ~ e1 would be equivalent to 
strict harmonisation.  
However Figure 5b shows that if environmental policies are strategic complements 
then the ‘ratchet effect’ works, and any combination of policies on state 2’s reaction 
function between N and M would be a Pareto improvement on the non-cooperative 
outcome. 
 
Thus neither of the policies frequently discussed - strict harmonisation or minimum 
standards - may yield improvements over the outcome where state governments are 
just left to set their own policies, thus contradicting claim 6 in the Introduction. Even 
if they do yield Pareto improvements over the non-cooperative equilibrium there is 
no reason in general to believe that they will be Pareto optimal for the two states. The 
obvious approach is for the federal government just to impose a cooperative solution. 
That raises the question the standard question when consideration is given to moving 
powers from state to federal level of whether the federal government would have 
enough information to calculate such an equilibrium. Ulph (1997b) assumes that 
damage costs are private information to state governments, so that any set of 
environmental policies imposed by the federal government would need to satisfy 
incentive compatibility constraints. The obvious constraint here is to prevent 
countries with high damage costs pretending to be low damage cost countries in 
order to be allowed to set lax environmental policies and hence obtain larger market 
shares. As Ulph (1997b) showed this can lead to environmental policies in countries 
which have different damage costs being more similar to each other than would be 
the case if the federal government had full information. The reason is simply that the 
need to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint means that countries with high 
damage costs have to be rewarded for revealing that information by being allowed to 
produce more output, and pollution, than would be the case with full information. 
However this falls short of full harmonisation. 
 
So far in this paper we have assumed that all governments are welfare maximising. 
But there is another reason why state governments may not implement first-best 
environmental policies and that is because they are responding to political influence  23 
exercised by powerful lobby groups. There is now a small literature applying political 
economy models of electoral competition or political influence to trade and 
environment
15. As with strategic trade arguments, these models can explain why, 
even in a small country, a government may not implement first-best environmental 
policies, or pursue free trade, but deviations from first-best could involve either too 
lax or too tough environmental policies depending on relative strengths of lobby 
groups. This literature also explains why environmentalists may support protectionist 
groups. However, this literature does not provide any support for a policy of 
harmonisation, for two reasons. First, even if it is true that environmental policies in 
some states are not first-best, that does not provide a reason to co-ordinate reforms of 
environmental policies; there have to be other reasons, such as those provided by 
strategic trade literature, for co-ordinating environmental policies. Second, the 
literature is entirely positive, and does not address the issue of whether or how to 
limit political influence on environmental policies. 
 
Johal and Ulph (1998) address this latter question in a model which builds on work 
of Boyer and Laffont (1996) and extends the model of Ulph (1997b) to include 
political economy elements. Thus suppose that federal and state governments can be 
elected to be either Green or Industrial in the sense that a Green government uses a 
utility function which gives environmental damages a greater weight than in a true 
welfare function while an Industrial government uses a utility function which gives 
environmental damage too little weight. Pollution is entirely local, i.e. it affects only 
the state in which it occurs. There is a key asymmetry of information about damage 
costs. We shall continue to assume that it is only the state government which knows 
how damaging pollution is in its state. In particular this information is not available 
to either the federal government or the voters in the state. Thus, it is only when the 
state government comes into power that it learns a key parameter of its damage cost 
function (which determines the level of total and marginal damage cost for any given 
level of emissions). If environmental policy is to be set at the federal level then the 
federal government will have to provide incentives for state governments to reveal 
this information to the federal government. There are two prior constitutional choices 
that the people in the two states face: whether to delegate the setting of 
environmental policy to the states (in which case they will act non-cooperatively, so 
we get environmental dumping) or to the federal government; and whether or not to 
‘tie governments hands’, i.e. to mandate the appropriate government (state or federal) 
to implement a specific environmental policy, that which maximises expected social 
welfare. We say expected social welfare because, as already noted, at the time the 
constitutional choice is made voters will not know the true value of environmental 
damages, and so if any policies are mandated at the constitutional stage they must be 
based on the expected value of environmental damages. Note that another key aspect 
is that at this prior constitutional stage the expected value of damage costs is the 
same for both states, so that any difference between states relates to the ex post 
damage costs, not the ex ante damage costs. Thus society essentially has a choice 
between allowing governments to come into power and learn the true value of 
environmental damages before setting environmental policies, but recognising that 
elected governments will pursue objectives which reflect the interests of the party in 
                                                            
15 See Hillman and Ursprung (1992, 1994), Frederikson (1997a, 1997b), Rauscher (1997); Ulph 
(1998) provides an overview.  24 
power, not social welfare; or else mandating governments to pursue policies which 
maximise expected welfare, but based only on the expected value of damage costs 
not the actual value of damage costs. Note that in the latter case, because expected 
damage costs are the same in both countries, tying governments hands will mean that 
environmental policies will be harmonised. Johal and Ulph(1998) show that whether 
or not it is decided to tie governments hands, it is better to set environmental policy 
at the federal rather than state level, and that when policy is set at the federal level it 
is more likely that society will want to tie governments hands; this is essentially 
because when policy is set at the federal level the gain to having policy set by 
governments who know the true value of environmental damage costs is reduced by 
the asymmetry of information between state and federal governments. This might 
provide some explanation for why as trade has become liberalised and hence the need 
to co-ordinate domestic environmental policies has increased there have been 
increasing calls for harmonisation of environmental policies; the explanation 
provided here is that harmonisation is designed to limit the extent of political 
influence on federal policy making. 
 
To summarise, in this section we have taken seriously the issue of non-cooperative 
nation state governments engaging in environmental dumping and asked what could 
be done to prevent this. We have presumed the existence of some supra-national 
body (‘federal government’) to whom powers can be given to implement policies to 
maximise the joint welfare of nation states. We have shown that widely canvassed 
policies such as harmonisation or minimum standards may not give Pareto 
improvements over the non-cooperative outcome depending on the degree of 
asymmetry between nation states and on whether environmental policies are strategic 
complements or strategic substitutes. In any case such policies are unlikely to be 
Pareto efficient, and we then investigated two possible limitations on the federal 
government implementing the cooperative solution - asymmetric information 
between state and federal governments, which does not justify policies such as 
harmonisation, and political influence, which, within a very special model, may 
provide some justification for harmonisation. However, if one is considering the 
possibility of restricting what governments do, then it may be more sensible to 
mandate state governments not to engage in strategic environmental policy in the first 
place (see Grossman and Maggi (1998) for related discussion in the context of 
strategic trade policy). 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we have addressed a number of concerns raised in recent debates on 
globalisation that faced with the threat of delocation of plants to countries with 
weaker environmental polcies, a threat that is particulaly associated in the public 
debate with multinational companies, nation states will be forced to engage in a race-
to-the-bottom in terms of environmental policies. To counter this possibility it is 
often recommended that there should be harmonisation of environmental policies, or 
at least the imposition of a set of ‘minimum standards’ for environmental polcies. 
 
We restated the above concerns in terms of six more specific claims. We reviewed 
some recent economic models and have shown that there is little substance to the 
fears about a race-to-the-bottom and that even if there were concerns about 
environmental dumping the usual policy prescriptions cannot be sustained in general. 
Our review of the empirical literature has also cast doubt on the significance attached 
in the debate to fears of delocation. 
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